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Stability of money: Phase transitions in an Ising economy
Stefan Bornholdt and Friedrich Wagner
Institut fu¨r Theoretische Physik, Universita¨t Kiel, Leibnizstrasse 15, D-24098 Kiel, Germany
The stability of money value is an important requisite for a functioning economy, yet it critically
depends on the actions of participants in the market themselves. Here we model the value of money
as a dynamical variable that results from trading between agents. The basic trading scenario can be
recast into an Ising type spin model and is studied on the hierarchical network structure of a Cayley
tree. We solve this model analytically and observe a phase transition between a one state phase,
always allowing for a stable money value, and a two state phase, where an unstable (inflationary)
phase occurs. The onset of inflation is discontinuous and follows a first order phase transition. The
stable phase provides a parameter region where money value is robust and can be stabilized without
fine tuning.
PACS numbers: 89.65.Gh, 05.50.+q, 64.60.Cn
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the astonishing facts in economics is the widely
observed stability of the value of money [1]. In models
of economic activity often well defined mechanisms are
introduced that ensure this property, e.g. by assuming a
central agent or market maker who supervises the global
dynamics and enforces market clearance. However, real
markets already function solely on the basis of the in-
teractions between trading agents [2], raising interesting
questions about the validity of equilibrium approaches
based on central agents [3]. The basic dynamics of a de-
centralized economy can also be studied in very simple
numerical models of pairwise exchange of goods between
agents [4]. Based on pairwise trading alone, one observes
emergence of money and fluctuations of value without
any explicit central processes of fixing global variables.
The value of money appears as a dynamical variable that
results from the dynamics of trading itself.
Money as a free parameter in a system of trading
agents has been studied by Bak, Norrelykke, and Shu-
bik recently [5], who cast the problem into a picture con-
sisting of simple agents and flows of money and goods
between them. They place the agents on a line, s.t. each
trader sells goods to his left neighbor and buys products
from his right neighbor. Combining this system with a
periodic boundary condition by closing the line to a cir-
cle, they observe that the value of money in general con-
verges to a stable state and emerges as a dynamical phe-
nomenon in this setting. They conclude that the general
picture of this model will also apply to the more compli-
cated heterogeneous networks of agents that in general
dominate economy.
However, as the dynamics of this model crucially de-
pend on a very specific choice of the boundary condition,
and as a higher dimensional scenario as well as hierar-
chies between traders may fundamentally change the dy-
namics, we would like to complement this model by a
spatial trading model, offering an alternative interpreta-
tion of Jevons’ motivation to understand the emergence
of money [6]. We will study trading on a hierarchical
network which allows us to include the interesting as-
pect of hierarchy in the monetary business. Also, mov-
ing to higher dimensions bears the interesting possibility
that a trader with more than two neighbors has extra
degrees of freedom to optimize himself by choosing ap-
propriate deals and partners. Finally, we will reformulate
this model in terms of an Ising type spin model that can
be solved explicitly.
In the next section we will introduce the basic trading
model on a network with dimension greater than one.
Section III is devoted to the problem of competing agents
in the presence of a variable money value. In section IV
we solve an Ising spin realization of the model and study
its phase transitions and the conditions for a stable value
of money.
II. A NETWORK TRADING MODEL
Let us consider a model where an agent N sells goods
which are traded via N − 1 intermediary agents to con-
sumers at level n = 0. This is called the selling mode.
The goods are returned by a second chain where agent
N buys goods, which are traded via N−1 different inter-
mediaries from n = 0 (buying mode). Combining both,
buying and selling chain, one obtains the circular geome-
try of ref. [5]. Let us now allow the more general scenario
that in the selling (or buying) mode each agent can sell
to (buy from) z− 1 agents. The linear chains (z = 2) are
replaced by a so-called Cayley tree with z neighbors.
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FIG. 1. Selling mode and buying mode for z = 3 on a
Cayley tree. The arrows show the flows of goods qn+1,i, while
money flow gn+1,i is opposite to qn+1,i at each link and is not
explicitly shown.
The agents are located at the sites or nodes, while
goods and money flow along the links of the tree. The
agents (n, i) are indexed by the distance n from the right
hand side of the tree. The index i distinguishes different
agents at the same distance and will be written only if
necessary. For the amount of goods qn,i flowing between
agents n and n− 1, i we use the normalized variable
q¯n,i =
1
(z − 1)n−1
qn,i (1)
The amount of traded goods is described by two utility
functions. If an agent n sells q at the price p he gains the
utility
u(S)n = In q¯ p− c˜(q¯). (2)
In denotes the value of money and c˜(q¯) the decrease of u
by losing q. Similarly, if the agent buys q at price p the
utility reads
u(B)n = d(q¯)− In q¯ p . (3)
It is important to use the normalized flow of goods (1)
instead of q for the following reason. In the monopolistic
equilibrium all the money values In are the same and all
goods are conserved. Therefore, the goods qn increase
with (z−1)n−1. Then, the utilities (2) and (3) express the
assumption that an agent level of n gets the same utility
by trading qn = (z − 1) qn−1 as the agents at level n− 1
trading qn−1. As in ref. [5] each agent n can choose its
own money value In, the amount of bought goods qn+1,
and the price pn,i for sold goods qn,i. For a meaningful
problem one has to use the following assumption, also
made in ref. [5]: The time scale on which the q or p
change is much shorter than the scale of changing the
money values. Therefore we can optimize the coupled
system (2) and (3) with fixed values of In. An additional
dynamics must be used for finding In from q(I) and p(I).
For the utility functions d and c˜ power laws have been
used in ref. [5]. This property is not really needed. It is
sufficient for c˜ to increase faster than, and for d less than
linearly for large q¯. To avoid algebraic complications, we
here use for d a power law
d(x) =
1
β
xβ with β < 1 (4)
and for c˜ a power law only in the example of section IV
c˜(x) =
1
α
xα with α > 1. (5)
In the general case, c˜ must have positive first and sec-
ond derivative. Having performed the optimization all
quantities can be expressed by the Legendre transform
of c˜(s1/β) denoted by c(r). For the power law (5) we get
c(r) =
α− β
α · β
(βr)
α
α−β . (6)
The optimization is slightly different in the buying or
selling mode. In the latter we have for each agent n
u(B)n =
1
β
q¯βn+1 − In q¯n+1 pn+1 n = 0, . . . , N − 1 (7)
u(S)n = In
∑
i
[q¯ni pni − c˜(q¯ni)] n = 1, . . . , N. (8)
Since
∑
i c˜(q¯i) < c˜(
∑
i q¯i) the agents n will handle each
selling to agents n − 1, i separately, and not lump all
requests qni into a single order. The optimization begins
at n = 0, where only u
(B)
n is present. The maximum
of (7) leads to the value q¯1. This value q¯1i(p1i) is used
to optimize p1i in u
(S)
1 given by (8). This procedure is
repeated to the top agent N . The resulting values of
traded goods and money flow gn,i from n− 1, i to n
gn,i = qn,i pn,i (9)
are given by
qn,i = (z − 1)
n−1
[
c′
(
In
In−1,i
)] 1
β
(10)
gn,i = (z − 1)
n−1 1
In−1,i
c′
(
In
In−1,i
)
. (11)
One sees that the goods flow and the valued money flow
In,i gn,i only depend on the ratios In/In−1, but not on
the absolute scale of I. The value of utilities in (7) and
(8) at the maximum are given by
u(B)n =
1− β
β
c′
(
In+1
In
)
(12)
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and by
u(S)n =
z−1∑
i=1
c
(
In
In−1,i
)
. (13)
The buying mode can be treated with the same method.
It can be obtained from the selling mode by interchanging
at each link (n;n− 1, i) the adjacent In and In−1. This
leads to
qn,i = (z − 1)
n−1
[
c′
(
In−1,i
In
)] 1
β
gn,i = (z − 1)
n−1 1
In
c′
(
In − 1, i
In
)
(14)
and the utility functions at maximum
u(B)n =
1− β
β
z−1∑
i=1
c′
(
In−1,i
In
)
u(S)n = c
(
In
In+1
)
. (15)
In the case of the linear chain (z = 2) the only difference
between selling and buying is a reordering of I, which is
performed in [5] by placing the agents on a circle. We
can consider the normalized money ratio at site n given
by (in the selling mode)
∆g(n+ 1, n, i) = (z − 1)
gn−1,i
gn
=
In
In−1,i
[
c′
(
In
In−1,i
)/
c′
(
In+1
In
)]
. (16)
Note that ∆g is only a function of the ratios
rn,i =
In+1
In,i
. (17)
Further, money conservation at agent n implies
z−1∑
i=1
∆g(n+ 1, n, i) = z − 1. (18)
For r > 1 money is accumulated at agent n, while r < 1
means that money has to be borrowed. Therefore in the
selling mode r < 1 implies an inflation, while values r >
1 imply deflation. In the buying mode r is essentially
replaced by 1/r such that ∆g is given by
∆g(n+ 1, n, i) =
In+1
In
[
c′
(
In−1,i
In
)/
c′
(
In
In+1
)]
(19)
and the reversed statements are true.
In the case of z = 2 in [5] the condition of money con-
servation has been applied. Both, the strategy of storing
money (‘Dagobert Duck mode’), as well as the strategy
of spending unlimited amounts of money (‘Donald Duck
mode’) are punished. There in each step of the update
of In the condition
∆g = 1 (20)
is imposed. The change of In results in new q, p values
and the procedure is repeated until convergence to (20)
is reached (the additional delay in [5] only changes the
time scale, but not the equilibrium (20)).
For z > 2 money conservation involves a sum of ∆g
over i. To fix the money flow gn,i to agent n, extra con-
ditions are needed. Such a condition may result from the
cooperation between agents n−1, i connected to n. Sup-
pose agent n sells the amount q =
∑
i qn,i which is bought
by agents n − 1, i. If they do not cooperate, one agent
may choose its In−1,i such that the sum is exhausted.
Then the system will collapse into a linear chain. If they
cooperate, they optimize their common utility
u(B) =
∑
i
1− β
β
q¯βn,i (21)
as function of In−1,i subject to the condition
∑
qn,i = q
since the qn,i are unique functions of the In−1,i. For β < 1
u(B) has a maximum for equal qn,i which implies In−1,i
is independent of i. Therefore we have the condition (20)
also valid for z > 2. In terms of the ratios r it reads
c′ (rn) = rn−1 c
′ (rn−1) . (22)
This recursion formula for the ratios rn exhibits the sta-
ble fixed point rn = 1, since both c
′(1) and c′′(1) are
positive. The value rN−1 is arbitrary. After a transient
region, the rn for n ≪ N are equal 1. For power laws
the recursion can be solved explicitly. rn depends only
on the ratio of the exponents
γ =
β
α
(23)
which can be called the relative elasticity of the utility
functions, and is given by
log rn = γ
N−1−n log rN−1 . (24)
The same method can be applied in the buying mode.
Now r′0 can be chosen arbitrarily due to the replacement
rn → 1/rn
log r′n = γ
n log r′0 . (25)
Both (24) and (25) can be used to obtain In resp. I
′
n
for the buying mode. In the selling mode, money is ac-
cumulated at agent N and the agents at n = 0 have to
borrow money. In order to ‘recycle’ the money, one can
connect n = 0 and n = N with a second tree in the buy-
ing mode where agents n = 0 sell other goods q′ over this
second tree to agent N . From I0 = I
′
0 and IN = I
′
N the
constants rN−1 and r
′
0 can be eliminated with the result
3
In = I0
(
IN
I0
)γn−N
. (26)
I ′n = IN
(
I0
IN
)γn
. (27)
In both (24) and (25) terms γN ≪ 1 have been neglected
in the exponent.
FIG. 2. The money values In/I0 for the selling mode (solid
line) and In/I0 for the buying mode (dotted line) as function
of n. A seller dominated market with IN/I0 = 5 has been
assumed. The increase of In/I0 near N exhibits the “peanuts
effect”.
The money values IN of agent N and I0 of the agents
at n = 0 are free constants. Their choice depends on
the relative weight the agents place on the utilities in the
buying or selling mode. A seller dominated market leads
to IN > I0. In Fig. 2 we show In and I
′
n as function of
n for γ = 1/4 and N = 11. In (I
′
n) are constant over a
wide range and change in the last (first) two steps to the
values imposed by the boundary conditions. Constant
money values are achieved even when they are different
in the selling and buying mode. This shows that the as-
sumption of periodic boundary conditions made in ref. [5]
is crucial for constant money values derived from money
conservation ∆g = 1 and not just minimizing the finite
size effects as in physical problems.
Another consequence of the recursion is the “peanuts
effect”: Consider the normalized flows of goods q¯n in a
seller dominated market, using a power law ansatz for
utility functions. They are constant for n ≪ 1 and in-
crease near n = N . The ratio
q¯N
q¯0
=
(
IN
I0
)1/(α−β)
(28)
may take large values, such that also u
(S)
N /u
(B)
0 becomes
large. This remarkable feature seems to have induced an
unfortunate german banker to publicly call the credits
given to small customers at n = 0 as “peanuts” (a state-
ment that was not agreed upon by the broad public) [7].
Up to now, the number z−1 of neighbors n−1 adjacent
to agent n did not play any roˆle given their money value
In−1,i has been chosen equally. In the next chapter we
use a dynamics to reach the equilibrium condition (20)
from an arbitrary initial state, including thermal noise.
The utility function for updating the In may have other
maxima besides the maximum described by (20). This
we investigate in the next section.
III. UTILITY FUNCTION FOR MONEY VALUES
The dynamics of ref. [5] for the money value In is
based on the conservation of money flux expressed by
∆g = 1 in the case z = 2. This method has several dis-
advantages. It is completely deterministic and does not
allow for noise. More importantly, it does not involve
the agents whose utility functions are minimal for the
monopolistic equilibrium r = 1. Even a possible utility
function for the dynamics would be rather complicated,
since ∆g on a Cayley tree connects agent n + 1 with
agents n − 1, i corresponding to a next to next neigh-
bor interaction. In addition, we encounter for z > 2 the
difficulty that money conservation in eqn. (18) does not
determine the dependence of gn,i on i. To improve and to
generalize the method of [5] the dynamics of the money
values will be based on an utility function H . Then the
noise can be described by a Boltzmann distribution. H
is the sum of two parts: One part HM contains the ef-
fect of the money authorities, the second HA is due to
the agents. The latter should involve all agents equally.
The simplest choice corresponds to a sum over all utilities
uS+uB. The key observation is that the utilities depend
on variables qn,i or rn−1,i = In/In−1,i, which are defined
on the links x = (n;n− 1, i) of the lattice. Moreover, the
sum of utilities can be rearranged into a sum over links
x
HA =
∑
agents
uS + uB ·
=
∑
x
uA(rx) (29)
with uA given in the selling mode by
uA(z) = c(z) +
1− β
β
c′(z). (30)
The money authority part must favor ∆g(n+1, n, i) = 1.
This establishes money conservation and a certain coop-
eration of the agents n, i to prefer equal money values
In,i. Since due to equation (16) ∆g = 1 only involves
neighboring ratios, this suggests that one should consider
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the model on the dual lattice which is obtained by replac-
ing the links (n+1;n) of the Cayley tree by nodes x, and
the nodes n by z − 1 dimensional hypertetraeders. This
dual lattice for z = 3 is called a cactus and is depicted in
Fig. 3.
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FIG. 3. The Cayley tree and its dual lattice for z = 3. On
the links denoted by * the ∆g variables are absent.
∆g(x, y) are variables defined on the links x, y of the
dual lattice. Nonvanishing values of ∆g exist only on the
links x, y depicted by the dotted lines in Fig. 3 which are
denoted by x > y. We model HM by a sum over all links
x > y of a utility function uM (∆g) having a maximum
at ∆g = 1. So we arrive at the following utility function
for the dynamics of r:
H(r) =
∑
x
uA(rx) +
∑
x>y
uM (∆g(x, y)). (31)
Possible equilibrium states without noise correspond to
the maximum of (31). Thermal noise is introduced by
assuming that the equilibrium distribution w(r) for r is
Boltzmann distributed with the utility function (31)
w(r) ∼ eβT H(r). (32)
βT corresponds to the inverse temperature and βT →∞
would be the deterministic limit. There exist many dy-
namics having (32) as equilibrium distribution. Partic-
ular interesting are local algorithms as the Glauber [8]
dynamics or the Metropolis algorithm [9]. In the lat-
ter a randomly chosen agent n selects a new I ′n thereby
changing its neighboring ratios rx to r
′
x. The change I
′
n
is accepted with probability
p = eβT min(0,∆H) (33)
where ∆H = H(r′) − H(r) denotes the change in the
utility function (31). It only involves the neighboring rx
which are known to the agents by the money- and goods
flows at n.
In the following section we discuss a realization of (31)
within an Ising type model. There has been a tradition
of using Ising and similar spin models in economic theory
[10]. Here, using an Ising formulation has the advantage
that the probabilities (32) for the average rx or correla-
tions can be computed explicitly.
IV. PHASE TRANSITIONS IN THE ISING
MODEL
In the deterministic limit βT →∞ the utility function
(31) should lead to the state rx = 1, corresponding to
the absolute maximum of H . However, there may be
additional local maxima with r 6= 1 which are frozen if
the thermal noise vanishes. To study this possibility we
consider the following simplified version of (31). We allow
only small deviations of r from 1 and parametrize r by
a two valued function with one value 1 and the other r0
close to 1
rx = r
1+σx
2
0 (34)
with an Ising spin variable σx = ±1. In addition we
assume for the utility function c a power law as in (5).
The Boltzmann weight (32) is a product of site factors
G(0)(σx) = e
βT uA(σx) (35)
and link factors
G(1)(σx, σy) = e
βT uM (∆g) (36)
with ∆g derived from (19) for the buying mode and from
(16) for the selling mode. In the latter we obtain
∆g(σx, σy) = r
(1−γ+σy−γσx)/(2(1−γ))
0 . (37)
For r0 close to 1, we can expand uM around 1 and obtain
G(1)(σx, σy) =
(
e−K(1−γ)
2
e−Kγ
2
e−K 1
)
σx,σy
(38)
with the money conservation constant
K =
(
−
βT u
′′
M (1)
2
) (
α ln r0
α− β
)2
. (39)
In (38) the irrelevant factor exp(βuM (1)) has been omit-
ted. In the same way we obtain for G(0)
G(0)(σx) = e
(z−1) L δσx,1 (40)
with the self interest constant
L =
βT
z − 1
[uA(r0)− uA(1)] . (41)
5
Using (38) and (40) the Boltzmann equilibrium distribu-
tion for the dynamical variables σ can be written as
w(σ) =
1
Z
∏
x
G(0)(σx)
∏
y<x
G(1)(σx, σy). (42)
The normalization factor Z follows from the condi-
tion
∑
{σ} w(σ) = 1. The distribution for a single
spin w1(σx) =
∑
σ 6=σx
w(σ) or two spins w2(σxσy) =∑
{σ 6=σx,σy}
w(σ) can be calculated recursively [13]. For
this purpose we introduce the tree distribution Tn(σx) of
length |x| = n corresponding to the product of all fac-
tors G(0) and G(1) on a dual tree starting at x, which is
summed over all spins σy with |y| ≥ |x|
Tn(σx) =
1
ZT
∑
{σy , y>x}
∏
|y|≥|x|
·

G(0)(σy) ∏
|y′|≥|y|
G(1)(σy , σy′)

 . (43)
ZT is chosen such that
∑
σ T (σ) = 1. For agent N (43)
yields the equilibrium distribution w1(σN ), for agents
|x| < N the tree distribution Tn(σx) is a conditional
probability related to w1(σx). According to (43) a tree
of length n can be expressed by trees of length n− 1 in
the following way
Tn(σ) = G
(0)(σ)
∑
σ1,...σz−1
z−1∏
i=1
G(1)(σ, σi) Tn−1(σi). (44)
Any function T (σ) depending on a variable σ = ±1 can
be parametrized as
Tn(σ) = an (wn δσ,1 + δσ,−1) . (45)
Carrying out the summation in (44) we find a recursion
relation for an+1 and wn+1 in terms of an and wn. For
the latter this reads
wn+1 = f(wn) (46)
f(w) =
[
e−Kγ
2+L 1 + e
(2γ−1)K w
1 + e−K w
]z−1
(47)
which allows the recursive calculation of wn if the values
wn at n = 0 are given. The mean value of rx for the top
agent x = N is related to wN by the inflation parameter
M =
〈
ln rx
ln r0
〉
= 〈δσx,1〉T =
wN
1 + wN
. (48)
Therefore wN ∼ 0 expresses the preference for rx = 1,
whereas wN ≫ 1 leads to rx ∼ r0. In physical prob-
lems 2M − 1 corresponds to the magnetization. Since
our utility function is not symmetric under σ → −σ the
disordered state M = 1/2 has no particular meaning.
Here only the fully magnetized states are interesting. In-
flation parameterM = 0 corresponds to the monopolistic
state and M = 1 implies inflation (r0 < 1) or deflation
(r0 > 1). Particularly interesting are stable fixed points
wn of the recursion (47). These are solutions independent
of n for n ≫ 1, especially independent of the boundary
values w0. They correspond to a homogeneous value of
the inflation parameter on the lattice. If more than one
fixed point exists, the system can exhibit different phases.
It is a particular property of the Cayley tree that the
values at the boundary decide which phase is adopted
[12,13]. On a normal finite dimensional lattice only one
phase would be thermodynamically stable. The form of
f(w) shows that the fixed point equation w = f(w) can
have either one or two solutions satisfying the stability
condition |f ′(w)| < 1. Depending on the values of K,L
and γ there can be a one state phase (OSP) with a unique
value of M or a two state phase (TSP) with two possible
values. In Fig. 4 we show for the numerical solution of
w = f(w) with z = 3 neighboring agents the inflation
parameter M(w) as a function of K for several L values
and γ = 0.25.
FIG. 4. The inflation parameter M as a function of K for
γ = 0.25 and z = 3. The L values are 0 (solid line), 0.5 (dotted
line), and 2.0 (dashed line). For L = 0, 0.5 the system is in
the one state phase. For L = 2 and 8.5 < K < 20.9 the
system allows two possible fixed points (two state phase).
At low L there will be a unique solution (OSP) in which
M tends to zero for large values K of the money conser-
vation term in H . M increases with the self interest L
of the agents. For sufficiently large L a switch into the
TSP with two possible values of M occurs. Still the mo-
nopolistic equilibrium can be achieved for large K. The
fixed point equation can be only solved numerically, the
calculation of the phase boundaries requires solution of
quadratic equations. One finds that TSP only occurs if
the following two conditions are satisfied. K has to be
larger than a critical value given by
6
Kc =
1
γ
ln
z
z − 2
, (49)
and L has to be bounded by
L−(K) < L < L+(K) . (50)
For the following we need only the asymptotic form of
L±(K) for K ≫ 1
L± = K
(
γ2 +
1
z − 1
)
− 2γK
{
1
z−1
1
(51)
For the linear chain (z = 2) discussed in [5] Kc becomes
infinite and a phase transition to TSP cannot occur. The
second condition (50) explains that a window for the TSP
phase is observed in Fig. 4. Another feature of the model
is the dependence on the elasticity γ. For values of γ < γc
with
γc = 1−
√
z − 2
z − 1
(52)
the lower bound L− is always positive. For fixed L and
K → ∞ one always ends up in the OSP in agreement
with what we have seen in Fig. 4.
FIG. 5. The inflation parameter M from eqn. (48) as func-
tion of K for γ = 0.6 and z = 3 and various L values. There
exists a critical K(L) where the system changes from the OSP
into the TSP with one value M1 ∼ 1 and one value with
M0 ∼ 0.
Choosing a value γ = 0.6 > γc we show in Fig. 5 the
inflation parameter M with z = 3 as function of K for
various L values. Above K0 with L = L−(K0) > 0 the
system is always in the TSP with M values near 0 or 1
corresponding to ratios of money values In/In−1 = 1 or
r0. Even in the deterministic limit K →∞ the inflation-
ary solution cannot be avoided. The boundaries of the
TSP phase in the ((K,L/K) plane are are shown in Fig.
6 (γ = 0.25 < γc) and Fig. 7 (γ = 0.6 > γc) for z = 3.
In Fig. 6 the regions where M is smaller than 0.5 (0.1)
are indicated by the dotted (dashed) line, which occur
outside of the TSP region. Therefore small values of M
are guaranteed in the limit of large K. In contrast for
γ > γc the region of small M lies entirely in the TSP
region, as seen from Fig. 7.
FIG. 6. Phase diagram for γ = 0.25 and z = 3 in the
(L/K,K) plane. The solid lines show the critical curves
L±(K) where the system changes from the OSP to the
TSP (L−(K) < L < L+(K). Along the dotted (dashed)
line M = 0.5(0.1) holds. Above the dotted (dashed) line
M > 0.5(0.1), below M < 0.5(0.1).
The OSP can be obtained only for negative L which im-
plies r0 < 1 which is against the agents interest in the
selling mode. On the other side for γ > γc small values
of M can be obtained already at moderate K.
FIG. 7. Phase diagram for γ = 0.6 and z = 3 in the
(K,L/K) plane. The solid lines show the critical curves
L±(K)/K as in Fig. 6. Along the the dashed line one so-
lution for w leads to M = 0.1. Below this line M can be
smaller than 0.1.
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The phase transition crossing the bounds L± from OSP
to TSP will be in general a first order transition, since M
can change discontinuously by ∆M . If one approaches
the end points of TSP near Kc given by (49), the discon-
tinuity vanishes with a power law according
∆M ∼ (K −Kc)
1
2 (53)
indicating a second order phase transition of the mean
field class. With increasing number z of neighboring
agents the boundaries of the TSP degenerate into straight
lines L+ = Kγ
2 and L− = Kγ(γ − 2) implying presence
of only the TSP for L/K < γ2. The same method can be
applied to the buying mode, where agent N buys goods
via the tree from agents at n = 0. One obtains a sim-
ilar recursion formula as (47) with value L′,K ′ and γ′
obtained by the replacement
L′ = −L , K ′ = γ2K and γ′ = 1/γ . (54)
This leads to qualitatively similar phase transitions.
The money value regulating authorities can achieve a
stable economy with an inflation parameter M = 0 for
given agent parameters L and γ by the choice of large K.
The success depends on the value of the elasticity ratio
γ = β/α. Very different utilities c˜(q) and d(q) lead to
γ ≪ 1. In this case the system remains in the OSP and
the desired result is obtained for largeK. For similar util-
ities c˜(q) and d(q) we expect γ ∼ 1 and TSP occurs with
M0 ∼ 0 andM1 ∼ 1. Which solution is obtained depends
on the boundary values of the agents at n = 0. Since their
utility function (12) increases with r0 they prefer a value
r0 > 1 leading to increasing money values from n = 0 to
n = N (deflation). Additional measures as indirect taxes
are required to persuade the n = 0 agents to choose the
solution M0. Alternatively one can close the selling tree
by a second tree in the buying mode, where the agents at
n = 0 sell their goods (f.ex. labor) through a tree to the
top agents. In general, such a mechanism should exist in
order to recycle the money flow from n = 0 to n = N
in the selling mode. In this case an inflationary value
r0 < 1 is preferred. Combining both trees indeed allows
the intermediate state r0 = 1 to be reached, as desired
in a stable economy.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we considered a trading model of agents
on the hierarchical network of a Cayley tree, treating
money values as dynamical variables. The claim of ref. [5]
that constant money values should result independently
of geometry and utility functions of the agents does not
appear to be entirely true. Even in the case of a linear
chain, imposing money conservation at each agent we find
constant I, however, different in the selling and buying
mode leading to the “peanuts effect”. Only within the
periodic boundary conditions of [5] these constants are
the same.
When agents are allowed to choose between neighbors,
as for z > 2, additional dynamical phenomena may oc-
cur, dependent on whether agents cooperate or not. We
include this as an optimization problem between near-
est neighbors and next to nearest neighbors which, mov-
ing the model to the dual lattice (the cactus in z = 3)
still can be described in terms of nearest neighbor inter-
actions (now between links). An elegant simplification
of this model in terms of an Ising model allows to in-
clude noise and to explicitly solve the model. The phases
of this Ising version of the model correspond to differ-
ent dynamical regimes of the economy. The main re-
sult is the existence of a two state phase above a critical
money conservation parameter Kc =
1
γ ln
z
z−2 with crit-
ical curves separating the one state phase from the two
state phase. In the two state phase one observes a first
order phase transition between an inflationary phase and
a phase with stable money value. For elasticity parame-
ters γ < γc = 1 −
√
z−2
z−1 the system can remain in a one
state phase with stable money value at K →∞, whereas
for γ > γc the two state phase cannot be avoided. Since
γ here is equal to the ratio of the exponents of the utility
functions, the details of the equilibrium properties de-
pend on the latter. In particular, they also depend on
the geometry as the two state phase does not occur in
the linear model.
These findings are obtained by approximating the ra-
tios of money values In+1/In by discrete Ising variables
with only two values and, less important, using power
laws for the utilities. The main motivation for these ap-
proximations is the possibility to carry out most calcula-
tions analytically. The assumption of power laws seems
to be not too restrictive. The first assumption of two
valued variables can be relaxed by using a larger number
of q different values for In+1/In. The resulting q-state
Potts model with only nearest neighbor interactions, for
K > 0 has a similar phase structure as the Ising model
[13]. The chaotic behavior observed in this model [14]
can, not entirely surprising, occur only for negative K
where the authorities aim for inflation. Therefore the
Ising models with ferromagnetic coupling (K > 0) should
be representative for the general case.
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